By Liesbeth Huppes-Cluysenaer, Nuno M.M.S. Coelho
1. advantage Jurisprudence: in the direction of an Aretaic conception of legislation; Lawrence B. Solum.- 2. Reasoning opposed to a deterministic/mechanistic notion of the realm; Liesbeth Huppes-Cluysenaer.- three. legislation and the guideline of legislation and its position relative to politeia in Ariostotle's Politics; Clifford Angell Bates.- 4.The most sensible kind of govt and Civic Friendship in Aristotle's Political idea; Ki-Won Hong.- five. Controversy and functional cause in Aristotle; Nuno M.M.S. Coelho.- 6. Aristotelian ethics and Aristotelian rhetoric; Marcel Becker.- 7. Is There Any idea of price in Aristotle's Ethics?; Antonio de Castro Caeiro.- eight. highbrow Excellences of the pass judgement on; Tommi Ralli.- nine. Justice kata nomos and justice as epieikeia (legality and equity); Samuli Hurri.- 10. Legality and fairness within the Rhetoric: the sleek Transition; Miklos Konczol.- eleven. felony principles and Epieikeia in Aristotle: Post-Positivism rediscovered; Jesus Vega.- 12. criminal Vices and Civic Virtues; Ekow N. Yankah.- thirteen. A neo-Aristotelian proposal of reciprocity: approximately civic friendship and (the frustrating personality of) correct judicial judgements; Iris van Domselaar.- 14. Synallagma as a paradigm of trade: reciprocity of agreement in Aristotle and video game idea; Mariusz Jerzy Golecki.- 15. the final precept of Proportionality and Aristotle; Eric Engle.- concerning the Authors.
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Additional resources for Aristotle and the philosophy of law : theory, practice and justice
But there is a problem with supplementing the lawfulness conception of the virtue of justice with the notion of equity. Understanding the problem begins with the fact that the virtue of equity seems to require the exercise of first-order private judgments of fairness. Once such judgments are admitted to have trumping force—to have the power to override the second order judgment that one should rely on the public judgments embodied in the law, the question becomes how the role of private judgment can be constrained.
We can restate this last point by using our distinction between types of judgments (first and second order, private and public). If judges rely on their own private, firstorder judgments of fairness as the basis for the resolution of disputes, then it follows inexorably that their judgments will be decrees (psêphismata) and not decisions on the basis of a second order, public judgment—in other words, not on the basis of a nomos. In other words, a judge who decides on the basis of her own private judgments about which outcome is fair—all things considered—is making decisions that are tyrannical in Aristotle’s sense.
Some decisions will obviously be just. Even persons who have incomplete legal knowledge or who have obtained only an incomplete degree of virtue will be able to recognize the justice of the decision. Such cases involve legal rules that are easy to grasp and fact situations in which the salience and application of the rule can be comprehended even by judges who are not especially wise or learned. Of course, even in simple cases, someone who is thoroughly blinded by self-interest might not concur in a widely shared judgment about what outcome is just.
Aristotle and the philosophy of law : theory, practice and justice by Liesbeth Huppes-Cluysenaer, Nuno M.M.S. Coelho